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Demythifying Contract Farming: 
Evidence from Rural South Africa 
 
Abstract 
This paper intends to contribute to the on-going debate about whether and how restructured agri-food 
markets can provide viable market opportunities for small-scale farmers in South Africa. It aims at 
analyzing contract farming from the small-scale farmer perspective and at better understanding the 
implications for small-scale farmers regarding contractual arrangements with processing and/or 
marketing firms. 
The paper, based on empirical research conducted in the Limpopo Province of South Africa 
and on a combination of qualitative and econometric analyses, argues however that contract 
farming is not a panacea for small-scale farmers. On one hand, contract farming improves 
agricultural production for contract farmers benefiting from increased incomes, enables 
better access to services and resources and creates new opportunities to participate in 
markets. However, on the other hand, the results, show that contract farming remains limited 
and mostly involves the already better-off, who have benefited from specific development 
paths and public support. This case study shows that contract farming by itself does not 
appear to provide an efficient means of reducing poverty, nor does it provide an institutional 
tool through which to improve rural livelihoods. It does therefore, not represent a tool for the 
majority of small farmers and for redressing the historical imbalances in the South African 
agricultural sector. 
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Introduction 
Poverty levels in South Africa remain high and concentrated, both socio-economically and 
geographically, with the previously disadvantaged communities within the rural areas 
particularly affected (Pauw and Mncube, 2007)1. In this context, agriculture, particularly the 
small-scale sector, is considered as one of the main economic sectors to revitalize the rural 
economy (National Planning Committee, 2010). As such, government has implemented 
several policies supporting the small-scale sector (DAFF, 2010). These initiatives have, 
however, had limited success (Anseeuw, 2004; Perret et al., 2005). 
It is in this context that the development of integrated value chains with the emergence of new 
private actors, partly a result of the global restructuring of markets and the deregulation of the 
agricultural sector, is seen as an opportunity for small-scale farmers. Indeed, the contractual 
arrangements accompanying these evolutions represent a possibility for small-scale farmers‟ 
integration into modern value chains. Contract farming is generally considered as an attractive 
mechanism for integrating poorer farmers into the open-market economy (Glover, 1984; Key 
and Runsten, 1999; Poulton et al., 2010) and, subsequently, for increasing production and 
farm income. But, as mentioned by Poulton et al. (2010), it may be selective, excluding the 
poor and subjecting them to high risks and agribusiness normalization, while failing to 
increase incomes due to unequal bargaining power with the farmers losing out. 
This paper intends to contribute to the on-going debate about whether and how restructured 
agri-food markets can provide viable market opportunities for small-scale farmers in South 
Africa. Based on empirical research regarding contract farming in the Limpopo Province of 
South Africa, the paper analyzes the determinants of participation in contracts and estimates 
their implications in terms of livelihoods. The South African case is particularly interesting. 
On one hand, due to the historical imbalances in access to land and secure tenure regimes, 
input and output markets, infrastructures and quality control systems, small-scale farmers face 
high transaction costs. Moreover, the differences in scale of trade between the small-scale 
farmers and agribusinesses put the farmers in a disadvantaged bargaining position (D'Haese 
and Van Huylenbroeck, 2005). On the other hand, the well-developed value-chains and the 
public supports available, in particular through land reform and positive action programmes, 
represent incentives and should contribute to a conducive market and production environment 
(DAFF, 2010). 
In the first section, literature review and background information on contract farming are 
presented, with a specific focus on South Africa. This is followed, in the second section, by 
the methodology used in the research study. Through a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, we will establish a typology of farm households and analyze the 
significance and determinants of contract farming and of farm incomes. The results of thse are 
presented in section three. These will then also lead, in section four, to wider conclusions on 
                                                 
1 Poverty rate indices for South Africa vary according to sources and methodologies: World Bank (2011) estimates that 22% 
lives on less than R524 whereas the National Planning Commission (2010) notes that 49% of the population lives on less 
than R283. 
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the role of agricultural contracts in general and in revitalizing South Africa‟s previously 
marginalized small-scale farming sector in particular. 
Background on Contract Farming 
Contract Farming and Types of Agricultural Contracts 
Contract farming can be defined as an agreement between a farmer and a buyer, ranging from 
simple oral arrangements to formal written documents, in which parties respectively commit 
to sell and buy specific volumes or acreages under pre-established conditions (Glover, 1984; 
Minot, 1986). The buyer can be a local or a transnational agribusiness (processor, exporter, 
retail outlet or shipper), a private plantation, a parastatal with its own production, or local 
merchants (greengrocers, wholesalers, hawkers, brokers etc.). 
In institutional economics, contract farming is described as a hybrid agreement that positions 
itself between the two extremes of the institutional arrangement spectrum, namely spot 
markets and market integration. On spot markets, products are sold and bought immediately, 
at a price set during the transaction and with no involvement of the buyer in the production or 
in the definition of the conditions of the transaction. At the other extreme, full vertical 
integration implies that the buyer controls all stages of production, processing and distribution 
throughout the value chain. Between these, contract farming allows the buyer a measure of 
control (decision-rights) over production without formally engaging in the farming activities 
(Grosh, 1994; Ménard, 2005). The allocation of risk depends on the terms of the contracts. As 
such, contract farming provides a response to market failures with respect to inputs, credit, 
insurance, information and outputs, by reducing the associated transaction costs, monitoring, 
transfer of goods and bargaining and enforcement (Key and Runsten, 1999; Poulton et al., 
2010). 
Literature on contract farming differentiates between three classic types of contracts 
according to their main objectives, the transfer of decision-rights and the shift of risk from the 
farmer to the buyer (Key and Runsten, 1999; Mighell and Jones, 1963; Minot, 1986). Market-
specification contracts refer to pre-harvest agreements that engage a buyer in providing a 
market outlet to a farmer under pre-established conditions often related to price, quantity, 
quality and timing. Thus, the farmer delegates a part of the risk to the buyer, while keeping 
control over production. Both the farmer and the buyer benefit from the price premium on the 
quality and stability in the flow of supply of products to specified markets.  
Management-providing (production-management) contracts are similar to marketing 
contracts. These contracts however delegate some of the farmer‟s control over the production 
process to the buyer. In terms of these contracts the adoption of specific farming practices 
(land preparation, planting dates, seedlings, fertilizers application rates and dates etc.) or the 
choice of post-harvest management practices will come under the technical supervision of the 
buyer to attain higher quality and to control the timing of output. The buyer recoups the costs 
of extension from the proceeds of marketing a higher-quality product according to the timing 
of demand. Finally, resource-providing contracts are the closest arrangement to full vertical 
integration and require not only that the buyer provide a market outlet to the farmer but also 
4 
Control
offered
to the buyer
(contractor)
Spot (cash) market
Market specification
contracts
Management-providing
(production-management) contracts 
Resource-providing contracts 
Full vertical integration
Risks
encountered
by the farmer
that he delivers input packages on credit and corresponding technical assistance in its use. It 
results in the buyer having major control over production with the contract shifting most 
decision-rights and risks to the buyer (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Typology of contracts  
Source: Adapted by the authors from Mighell and Jones (1963) and Minot (1986) 
 
Contract farming may overcome certain constraints small-scale farmers are typically faced 
with in developing countries, such as access to resources (inputs, services, and information) 
and markets. In South Africa, black small farmers struggle with access to resources as a result 
of the marginalization which occurred through discriminatory policies under apartheid 
(Eastwood et al., 2006). Today, about 1.2 million black small farmers occupy 18% of the 
farm land (13% communal land in the former homelands and 5% redistributed land through 
land reform). These farmers mainly engage in family-based, subsistence agriculture 
(compared to around 40,000 large-scale farmers, owning 82% of the privately owned 
agricultural land, characterized by highly intensive farming activities and producing 95% of 
the country‟s marketed agricultural output). Most of them lack access to resources (land, 
water, infrastructure, credit facilities). Consequently, contract farming could facilitate their 
access to information, technical assistance, credit and inputs, reduce the uncertainty around 
marketing their products, improve their integration into modern value-chains and 
consequently, increase their farm incomes (Glover, 1984; Key and Runsten, 1999; Minot, 
1986; World Bank, 2007), and provide institutional mechanisms to address the difficulties 
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they face. However, contract farming could potentially also lead to increasing market 
segmentation and exclusion (Little and Watts, 1994; Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997a, 
1997b; Poulton et al., 2010; Vorley et al., 2007) or remain limited in terms of the number of 
farmers involved, limiting the overall impact (Losch et al., 2010). 
Development and scale of contract farming in South Africa 
Contract farming has a long history in South African agriculture (Karaan, 1999; Kirsten and 
Sartorius, 2002a, 2002b; Louw et al., 2006; Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997a, 1997b, 
Ortmann and King 2010). The historical development of agricultural contracts can be traced 
since the early 1900s in relation with the emergence of cooperatives (Ortmann and King, 
2006; 2007; 2010). This highlights the significant role of contracts in the development of 
white commercial agriculture. Indeed, until the 1990s, white farmers benefited from input 
supplies (seeds, fertilizers, chemicals and credit), marketing facilities through various boards 
and service provision (storage, transport) organized by the cooperatives through various 
institutional arrangements. Due to the discriminatory policies, black farmers located in the 
homelands had only limited, if any, access to most domestic markets, and consequently to 
their contracts. They commercialized their outputs – when they were able to generate 
surpluses –on informal local markets within the homelands. 
Contract farming in South Africa has been analyzed for small-scale farmers in traditional 
value chains such as tea, sugarcane, timber, tobacco, flowers and beverages (Kirsten and 
Sartorius, 2002b). These schemes appear however to be more the result of specific initiatives 
of large estate actors during apartheid and the pre-liberalization period, than what McMichael 
and Myhre (1991) call the “restructuring of agrifood markets”. Quantifying the scale of 
contract farming, whatever the level of analysis, is extremely difficult. Whereas some authors 
attempt to estimate the scope of its development in Africa (Grosh, 1994; Little and Watts, 
1994), most studies in this respect focus on its impact on the farm and household (e.g., 
Bellemare, 2010a, 2010b; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). In a study on contract farming in 
South Africa, Vermeulen et al. (2008) estimate its scale in the fresh produce sector and 
assesses the level of participation of small-scale farmers. This research shows that almost 
80% of the volumes of fruits and vegetables supplying the South African processing industry 
(21% of the production) was exchanged through contracts and that between 70% and 100% of 
the produce sold in supermarkets were supplied under contract, while the meat and egg 
sectors favored full vertical integration (Vermeulen et al., 2008). This study also showed that 
only 5% of the contracts identified involved small-scale farmers with few suppliers. These 
results confirm the findings of previous studies which show that contract farming, for fresh 
produce in particular, usually implies a small number of producers, and very few small 
farmers (table 1). 
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Table 1: Extent of Contract farming in South Africa for selected commodities 
Sub-sector # of farmers 
under contracts 
# of small-scale 
and emerging farmers 
under contracts 
% of South African farmers 
under contracts* 
Sugar cane 16 045  14 445 small-scale growers 
(8% of sugarcane production)  
+ 385 emerging growers 
1.2% 
Timber 50 000 15 000 4% 
Cotton 3 000 - 0.2% 
Processed fruits 
Snack and Nuts 
2 709  209 0.2% 
All Fresh Fruits 
and Vegetables 
3 430 278 0.3% 
Processed 
Vegetables 
350 87 ns 
Sources: authors compilation from Vermeulen 2008; FAO 2004, South African Sugar 
Association 2011 and FAO Expert Consultation on Contract farming in Africa, Johannesburg, 
South Africa (04 – 07 May 2009). 
* The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries‟ annual report 2009/10 estimates 
40 000 commercial farm units in 2007 and 1.2 million small-scale farms in the former 
homelands. 
Methodology 
Measuring the contribution of agricultural contracts to farmers‟ welfare levels is 
methodologically challenging. Contracts are often not randomly distributed among 
households (Barrett et al., 2010) and their access needs to be instrumented in a regression 
analysis of its impact on welfare (Bellemare, 2010b). In this paper, a three-step selection 
model is developed, addressing the determinants of access to contracts, as well as the decision 
to market produces, while estimating the impact of contracts on income and not on welfare. 
Secondly, the econometric model is entwined with a qualitative approach that studies a 
typology of households and their development paths. This enables us to draw more informed 
conclusions on the reasons why some farmers are being excluded from markets and/or 
contract farming. The combination of standard econometric models with qualitative analyses 
is particularly original and relevant. 
Site selection and sample 
Data for this study was collected from farm households in the Greater Tzaneen Municipality 
in the Limpopo Province2 (Figure 2). Within the greater municipality, the survey was 
conducted in the region of Nwa‟Mitwa which includes the settlements of Mandlakhazi, 
Mbekwani, Nwa‟Mitwa, Nwadjaheni and Babanana as well as the private farms surrounding 
the community (Jaffray, Welverwacht, Taganashoek, La Dauphine, Duplex and Uitzoek). 
                                                 
2 Limpopo Province is located in the North of South Africa. It is a typical developing area, characterised by the export of 
primary products and the import of manufactured goods and services. It is one of the poorest regions of South Africa. 
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Figure 2: Location of the study area 
 
The selection of the study area was based on the following criteria: 
1. Agro-climatic conditions and importance of agriculture 
The area is characterized by relatively good agro-climatic conditions with a tropical/semi-arid 
climate (average temperature of 25°C, with annual rainfall of between 500 and 700 mm) and 
by relatively homogeneous soils (alluvial and sandy on the top and flat areas, clay soils in the 
lower lying areas). Despite a distinct dry season, crop production is possible throughout the 
year under irrigation. As a result, agriculture is well developed and the most important 
economic activity in the Mopani District where the study area is located3. 
2. Historical background, land characteristics and poverty prevalence 
The Southern part of Nwa‟Mitwa is located on tribal lands that were part of the Gazankulu 
Homeland. Agriculture is representative of the overall prevailing situation in the former 
Homelands, consisting of small plots with communal land tenure, cropping and livestock 
systems based on traditional practices, farming activities dedicated to family consumption, 
high demographic and land pressure etc. Most households face a daily struggle with poverty, 
particularly due to the high average age of the population as well as general under- and- 
unemployment. The Northern part consists of commercial farms. This sub-region is subject to 
land claims and some governmental projects have been implemented. 
3. Market proximity, off-farm jobs and contract farming opportunities 
The proximity to commercial farms both located in the study region and in the Great Letaba 
River Valley, one of the leading regions for fruit and vegetable production, has enhanced the 
development of agricultural wage labour opportunities and the presence of contract farming. 
The population of the study area is estimated at around 16 000 households (Municipal 
Demarcation Board, 2006) of which, according to our findings, i) about 2000 are involved in 
                                                 
3 Mainly citrus and subtropical fruits are produced in the area for both domestic and export markets. The area is also known 
for its tomatoes (constituting approximately 60% of tomato production in South Africa). 
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agriculture, including livestock and self-consumed cropping activities in gardens and ii) 82 
are private land owners. A probability sample was not possible because exact lists of 
community members were unavailable. It was consequently decided to conduct:  
(a) 110 questionnaires among a random group of respondents geographically spread over the 
area, which allowed, considering the available time and resources, for capturing the existing 
diversity and to provide the necessary information for the establishment of a typology. The 
survey was random but the number of commercial and contract farmers were purposefully 
higher. Four cases were deleted from the analysis due to missing data, resulting in a data set 
of 106 valid cases;  
(b) 40 complementary interviews among selected households identified during the first 110 
interviews in order to better understand their specific trajectories;  
(c) 36 complementary questionnaires among farmers engaged in contracts and also identified 
in first round of interviews and  
(d) 239 additional short questionnaires to check how representative the results are in relation 
to the size of the population in the region.  
The dataset is rich and representative regarding the diversity of farming systems and contracts 
in the study area. Firstly, it combines quantitative and qualitative data. Secondly, as we will 
show in the analysis, it covers a whole range of farming systems ranging from less developed 
and subsistence small-scale systems to more advanced large-scale and commercial ventures. 
Thirdly, it includes farmers with and without contracts and assesses the type of agreements 
they are involved with. Finally, the dataset enables comparison across farm households with 
different land tenure regimes and different levels of governmental support, including 
beneficiaries from land reform programmes. 
Qualitative data analysis 
Two methodological approaches were used to analyze agriculture and rural livelihoods. 
Firstly, an agrarian systems diagnostic approach was implemented in order to characterize the 
agro-ecological, technical, historical and socioeconomic factors influencing the 
transformation of the rural environment (Cochet and Devienne, 2004; Dufumier, 1996). Then 
agricultural practices were analsed (combinations of crops and livestock and their productivity 
levels) which were subsequently linked to the asset endowment and households‟ development 
paths to establish a consistent typology. Secondly, a livelihood approach was applied to each 
identified type of household, aimed at understanding the combination of activities and income 
sources. 
Quantitative analysis  
The econometric approach aimed at analyzing the determinants of the uptake of contracts and 
contract farming‟s contribution to the households‟ farm income. The analysis was done in 
three stages. In the first instance, a probit model was used to analyze the uptake of contracts. 
The second step (first model of a Heckman model) was a probit analysis of factors 
determining whether or not farmers commercialize their agricultural produce (if not, they are 
considered to be subsistence farmers). The third step (second model of the Heckman model) 
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was a regression analysis of the determinants of farm income for farmers participating in 
markets. The independent variables included the probabilities of having a contract (saved 
results of the first probit model) and the inverse mills ratio that was saved from the second 
probit model. The estimation of the probit model as well as the Heckman procedure (models 
two and three were jointly estimated) was done using Stata. A description of the Heckman 
model is given in Annex 1. 
The rationale behind this approach is the latent endogeneity and selection-bias issues around 
the uptake of contracts and commercialization of on-farm income. While market orientation, 
as opposed to the choice of subsistence production, is intrinsically linked to farm income, we 
suspected selection biases and corrected these by estimating a Heckman model (Greene, 
2000). We also suspected that the uptake of contracts would be endogenous to farm income as 
a buyer‟s decision to procure from a certain region and within that region from a number of 
sellers, is not random (Barrett et al., 2010; Bellemare, 2010b). Because the analysis seeks to 
test whether contract farming increases farm income, we needed to instrument the uptake of 
contracts to address these potential endogeneity problems while controlling for the decision to 
sell agricultural produce. Following Wollni and Zeller (2007), we introduce the probabilities 
obtained from the probit model on uptake in the farm income model. It is worth noting that 
farmers who had contracts were marketing their produce, while not all farmers who were 
marketing, had contracts. Contract uptake is instrumented by the importance of off-farm 
income in the total household income.4 Furthermore, there is no theoretical reason to assume a 
causal relationship between the share of income from off-farm sources and agricultural 
income. Likewise, the likelihood to market produce is instrumented by the level of transfers; 
high social grants and remittances may influence the likehood that farmers commercialize, but 
they are exogenous and arguably not necessarily causally linked to farm income. 
The independent variables selected for the first probit model are similar to those commonly 
used in literature for similar models (Bolwig et al., 2009; Miyata et al., 2009; Wollni et al., 
2010; Wollni and Zeller, 2007) namely (a) household characteristics (household size, age and 
gender of the head); (b) assets endowments (land area, size of the cattle herd) and (c) share of 
off-farm income in total income. 
The model for household i then becomes:  
iiiiiiiii ufarmoffincomesharecattlearealandgendersquaredageageizehouseholdsC  _____ 76543210   
(1)  
with Ci being a dummy variable (0/1) indicating if the household has a contract or not, and ui 
being the error term. The probability of Ci=1 is calculated by a probit model similar to the 
first step of the Heckman model given in equation (2‟) in Annex 1. 
Independent variables for the second probit model were similar to exogenous household 
characteristics in the first model (household size, age and gender of the head), supplemented 
                                                 
4 We assume that off-farm income is exogenous to farm income at household level because it consists mainly of welfare 
grants and remittances. In the case of cross-financing, livelihood diversification (increasing the share of off-farm income 
in total income) may increase agricultural income. It is equally possible however, that farm income may decrease as the 
share of off-farm income increases, in those instances where the off-farm income satisfies the household‟s utility levels. 
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with the level of education of the head and income from transfers. As mentioned above, we 
consider the two latter variables as relevant because these additional income sources will 
determine the choice of farming system without directly influencing the farm income. 
The model is for household i: Market participation Mi = 
iiiiiiiii vedracesremitgrantssocialeducationgendersquaredageageizehouseholds  inftan__ 876543210   
(2) 
with vi being the error term. This function is the first step of a Heckman selection model as 
explained in Annex 1.  
Agricultural income is regressed against (a) the household structure (age, gender), (b) farm 
characteristics (number of active people on the farm, land, access to irrigation and land tenure 
regimes) and (c) the probability of access to contracts 
The model then becomes for household i:  
iiiiiiiiii wIMiCedraesbeneficarireformlandtenureprivatelandgenderagemembersactiveY  9876543210 inf____ 
 
with IMi being the inverse mills ratio/lambda, and wi the error term.  
The second step of the Heckman procedures is expressed by equation (1‟) and solved as 
presented in Annex 1, for those households who are participating in the market. It should be 
noted that due to the relative low number of cases in this second step, the number of variables 
were limited and the results were interpreted with care. However, the outcome of the 
econometric models is confronted with the qualitative data analysis. 
Results 
Household Typology 
From the 106 households interviewed, eight types of farming systems were identified (Table 
2). Four criteria were used: (i) the size and the type of land (garden, communal area, private 
land); (ii) the commercialization of agricultural products, included the buyers (spot markets, 
local merchants, supermarkets, processors, export agents) and the destination of the products 
when sold (local, domestic, export markets); (iii) the combination of crops and livestock 
(share of staple food, of fruits and vegetables, of livestock in the farm production value) and 
asset endowment (equipments, irrigation systems etc.) and (iv) access to and the importance 
of off-farm income. 
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Table 2: Typology of farming households in the Greater Tzaneen Municipality 
 n* % of the sample % of HH** in area 
Micro-farmers cultivating residential gardens 
for self consumption, depending on off-farm 
activities, remittances and social grants 
15 14.2% 53.8% 
Subsistence small-scale farmers depending on 
off-farm income, combining staples for self-
consumption and vegetables for local markets 
28 26.4% 39.6% 
Small-scale producers of staples and F&V for 
local markets, depending on off-farm activities 
and social grants 
6 5.7% 4% 
Medium-scale producers specialized in 
vegetables production for the local and 
domestic markets 
24 22.6% 1% 
Emerging industrial chicken and vegetables 
producers 
16 15.1% 0.2% 
Extensive commercial farmers, producers of 
fruits mainly for the domestic market 
11 10.4% 1% 
Intensive commercial producers of fruits and 
vegetables for the domestic and export markets 
6 5.7% 0.4% 
Total 
 
106 100% 100% 
Notes: *Number of detailed questionnaires to a random group of respondents allowing for the capturing of the 
diversity in household types. **Based on the results of the 239 short interviews conducted and being 
representative of the population in the study area. 
 
Micro-farmers cultivating residential gardens for self consumption, depending on off-farm 
incomes (n=15) 
The micro-farmer group is very heterogeneous in terms of livelihoods. These mostly female 
headed households implement survival strategies to cope with very low incomes and take any 
opportunity that allows them to improve their livelihoods such as small irregular jobs in the 
service sector in the community, casual agricultural labour, social grants and remittances 
(with the younger, active population often having migrated). However, despite engaging in 
these diverse activities, these households hardly succeed in generating an income above the 
poverty line. In terms of farming, they have no or very poor access to land and consequently 
rely only on the cultivation of residential gardens. They combine starchy staples and 
vegetable production for family consumption, producing only during the rainy season due to a 
lack of access to irrigation water. As a result, farming activities are limited and contributes 
only marginally to this group‟s subsistence (21% of global income). With insufficient access 
to assets and insufficient production, this group is mainly excluded from markets and farming 
provides only a basis for food security. 
Subsistence small-scale farmers depending on off-farm income, combining staples for self-
consumption and vegetables for local markets (n=28) 
The second group consists of couples composed of a retired person and an active person 
engaged in a permanent activity (small business). Social grants or off-farm income was 
invested in an irrigation system which provides water for domestic use, for the sale of 
drinking water to the community and for irrigation purposes (manual only). Unlike the micro-
farmer group, these households have access to a plot of arable land in the communal lands (on 
12 
average one hectare), allowing them to cultivate staples and vegetables and to keep an orchard 
(mangoes). They also have a small herd of cattle that graze on communal land and fatten pigs. 
The produce is sold on spot markets within the community or to local merchants. The farming 
activity allows them to have food and a financial basis but for most of them, farming is not 
considered to be a productive activity (17% of total income). They furthermore have no 
investment capacity and heavily rely on social grants for their subsistence. 
Small-scale producers of staples and fruits and vegetables for local markets, depending on 
off-farm activities and social grants (n=6) 
The third group combines small-scale farming (28% of global income), off-farm activities 
(taxi, small business) and social grants, which represent a significant part of their income 
(34%). Off-farm income, invested in an irrigation system, has allowed them to develop a 
marketable all year round vegetable production. These households have access to a plot in the 
communal area (average size 1.8 hectares) which they cultivate in addition to a garden. 
Products are sold on spot markets or to local merchants. For this group, farming is a 
productive activity and the basis of their livelihoods; they would like to develop their farming 
activity if their constraints can be overcome (limited access to resources, lack of credit, 
difficulties to collect and transport their products to markets etc.). 
Medium-scale producers specialized in vegetables production for the local and domestic 
markets (n=24) 
These households are better endowed (largest plots in communal lands) and due to more 
efficient infrastructure (private borehole, irrigation systems, tractor and private vehicle) they 
were able to develop a marketable vegetable production (up to three cycles per year) which 
they sell to local merchants, to fresh produce markets or under formal contracts to 
supermarkets (organic production-management contracts), to processors or restaurants 
(marketing contracts). As a result of successful but expensive practices, farming has become 
the pillar of their livelihood (67% of total income), the rest being non-farm sources. Farming 
is a profitable means of existence to them but without the massive support or the opportunities 
from which they benefitted on the basis of their personal social networks in order to access 
both production factors and market opportunities, or both, they would not have been able to 
develop this activity. 
Emerging industrial chicken and vegetables producers (n=16) 
These households are specialized in intensive vegetable production under management 
production contracts with agribusinesses and/or industrial broiler production under resource 
providing contracts with a local agribusiness (Bushvalley). Agriculture is their only economic 
activity. The viability and the sustainability of this specialized and intensive but expensive 
farming system is questionable, both in agro-ecological as well as economical terms. It is not 
clear if the farmers engaged in this production system would have had the means to invest and 
renew their equipment and to develop an economically sustainable activity without massive 
external (mostly governmental) support. 
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Extensive commercial farmers, producers of fruits mainly for the domestic market (n=11) 
Extensive commercial farmers combine an independent or a qualified permanent off-farm 
activity and managerial farm requiring numerous workers. They are well equipped with an 
operational irrigation system and a tractor. They have specialized in extensive mango 
production (low use of inputs and workforce). Mangoes are usually harvested green to be 
delivered to local processors or sold ripe to merchants, fresh produce markets or exporting 
agents. Some of them have contracts (marketing) which are usually verbally concluded. 
Intensive commercial producers of fruits and vegetables for the domestic and export 
markets (n=6) 
The households of this last group are specialized in managerial farming. They have developed 
an intensive (in terms of labor, capital and inputs) production of fruits under irrigation. They 
own tractors, greenhouses, warehouses and a packing unit each to satisfy the requirements and 
the standards of their buyers (local merchants, processors, fresh produce markets and 
exporting agents) with whom half of them have various types of contracts (mostly marketing 
but also production-management contracts). Their activities are concentrated on large areas of 
private land. They combine their production activities with extensive cattle breeding on 
private pastures. 
Table 2 also presents the distribution of the six types, based on a shorter survey conducted 
among a larger number of farmers in the study area (n=239). The resulting distribution differs 
from the one based on the long survey. The micro-farmers seem to be the largest group 
(53.8%) followed by subsistence small-scale farmers (39.6%). From the 106 farmers in the 
analysis that participated in the long interview, medium-scale farmers (1%), emerging 
industrial chicken producers (0.2%), and intensive (0.4%) and extensive (1%) commercial 
farmers seem to be overrepresented.  
Extent and characteristics of contract farmers 
The extent of contract farming in the region remains limited with only 36 farmers (34% of the 
interviewees) having at least one contract, whether verbal or in writing. Following our 
findings in the short survey, contract farmers represent less than 1.2% of the total number of 
farm households in the region. The limited extent of contract farming can be explained by the 
fact that, as shown by the typology analysis, the majority (54% of the interviewees) are micro 
or small-scale subsistence oriented farmers. As they do not participate in markets they are also 
excluded from contract farming, as confirmed in Table 3 which links the farm household 
typology with the participation in markets, contracts and the destination of the agricultural 
produce. 
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Table 3: Buyers, contracts, and types of households 
 Types of buyers 
% each type 
have at least 
one  contract 
Types of agricultural contracts 
Micro-farmers  No sale 0% No contract 
Subsistence small-scale  
No sale 
0% No contract 
Spot markets 
Small-scale producers  
Spot markets 
0% No contract 
Local merchants 
Medium-scale producers  
Local merchants 
57% 
No contract 
Fresh Produce 
markets (FPM) 
No contract 
Restaurants Informal marketing agreements 
Supermarkets 
No contract or formal organic production-
management contracts  
Processors 
Informal marketing agreements or formal 
production-management contracts  
Emerging farmers 
Local merchants 
100% 
No contract or informal agreements 
Road-side stalls Informal marketing agreements 
FPM No contract or informal marketing agreements 
Supermarkets Formal organic production-management contracts 
Processors 
Informal agreements or formal production-
management contracts  
Extensive commercial farmers 
Local merchants 
27% 
No contract 
FPM  No contract or informal marketing agreements 
Processors Informal gentlemen agreements 
Exporting agents Formal market-specification contracts  
Intensive commercial farmers 
Local merchants 
50% 
No contract or informal gentlemen agreements 
FPM 
No contract or informal gentlemen marketing 
agreements 
Processors 
Informal agreements or formal marketing or 
production-management contracts 
Exporting agents Marketing contracts 
 
Tables 4 and 5 compare the mean values of major characteristics of contract farmers and non-
contract farmers. The two groups differ significantly in their demographic characteristics, 
asset endowment and income structure. Contract farmers seem to have smaller households 
(with less older members and more children) and are led by younger heads (mostly male); 
they have better access to land, mostly under private tenure or in land reform schemes and all 
of them have access to irrigation (through various types of irrigation systems), with larger 
cattle herds and higher agricultural incomes. Among the group of non-contracted farmers we 
count more female headed households with significantly lower levels of education, less land 
(consisting mainly of gardens) and with a greater dependency on social grants. 
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Table 4: Comparison of means between contract and non-contract farmers (standard 
deviation in brackets) 
 Contracted farmers 
(n=36) 
Non contracted 
farmers (n=70) 
T-stat 
Household size (nb) 2.56  
(1.92) 
5.17  
(3.11) 
5.338*** 
Share children in household (%) 14.41  
(17.76) 
6.88  
(18.02) 
2.049** 
Age of household head (years) 50.42  
(11.84) 
57.41  
(14.47) 
2.500** 
Available land (ha)  98.04  
(106.43) 
20.17  
(63.60) 
-4.035*** 
Cultivated land (ha)  36.58  
(63.76) 
10.69  
(30.98) 
-2.300*** 
Share cultivated (%) 41  
(33) 
92  
(22) 
8.197*** 
Number of cattle  19.03  
(43.88) 
4.26  
(13.28) 
-1.974* 
Agricultural income (R/year)  2,095,423  
(3,122,966) 
143,956  
(600,139) 
-3.714*** 
Remittances received (R/year)  2,666  
(5,928) 
4,670  
(14,609) 
0.789 
Social grants received (R/year)  4,369  
(6,991) 
8,314  
(7,714) 
2.572** 
Total income (R/year)  2,115,694  
(3,115,194) 
171,919  
(601,174) 
-3.708*** 
 
Share of income from off-farm source (%) 16.5 
(28.5) 
63.7 
(33.9) 
7.568*** 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
Table 5: Comparison of shares (%) of determinants between contracted and non-
contracted farmers  
 Contracted 
farmers (n=36) 
Non contracted 
farmers (n=70) 
Chi-square-stat 
Gender household head (% male) 83 47 12.915*** 
Access to off-farm income (% yes) 56 89 14.795*** 
Education above primary level (%yes) 94 33 36.276*** 
Rain-fed production (% yes) 11 50 14.460*** 
Private land tenure (%)  50 17  
Communal land tenure (%)  14 10  
Gardens (%) 0 63  
Land reform (%) 36 0  
Garden + communal land (%) 0 10 60.893*** 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%  
a
 Chi-square test for land reform versus contract farming 
 
In the probit model we explain participation using several variables which are expected to 
determine households‟ ability to engage in contracts. The probit model is highly significant 
and predicts almost 88% of the observed engagement in contracts (Table 6). The model 
supports the conclusions of the typology analysis and finds that land size increases the 
probability to engage in contracts while the share of off-farm income in the total income 
decreases this probability. The model confirms that farmers with low land endowments 
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(micro-subsistence and small-scale farmers) are more likely to be excluded from contract 
farming. 
Table 6: Probit model of uptake of contracts (0: no contract; 1: contract) 
 Coefficient Robust std. error z-stat 
Household size -0.247 0.086 -2.87*** 
Age of household head (yrs) 0.201 0.091 2.21** 
Age squared (yrs²) -0.002 0.001 -2.40** 
Gender of household head 
(1:male/2:female) 
-0.248 0.352 -0.70 
Share off-farm income (%) -0.012 0.007 -1.68* 
Log land size (log ha+1) 0.282 0.138 2.04** 
Cattle (number of heads) 0.001 0.005 0.19 
Constant -3.870 2.229 -1.74* 
N= 106 
Wald chi²=36.67 
Pseudo R²= 0.519 
Correctly classified 87.5%  
   
 
The combined quantitative and econometric analysis thus assists in classifying the contract 
farmers into two categories. The first group of households consists of large-scale commercial 
farmers. The analysis of their trajectories (see Figure 3) shows that they access contracts as 
preferred suppliers of processors, supermarkets and exporting agents as a result of a good 
asset endowment base (large cultivated areas on private land; efficient irrigation systems and 
equipment). They have succeeded in equipping the farm and becoming, relatively speaking, 
highly productive due to the public support they received during apartheid (subsidized interest 
rates, tax concessions and price support combined with strong institutional arrangements with 
cooperatives). After liberalization, the deregulation of markets and the dismantling of 
parastatals, only the largest and the more efficient farmers in this group were able to meet the 
required volumes and quality (norms and safety standards) and succeeded in remaining 
preferred suppliers. 
The second group, which is the target group of the project, consists of smaller-scale farmers 
located on both private (redistributed) land and communal areas. The analysis of their 
trajectories shows convergent trends. Most of them accessed support measures as a result of 
social networks established before the end of apartheid (for example, access to land and 
support as public workers or as decision makers in the Homelands). Others benefited from 
recent public support in the context of Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment for 
Agriculture and other affirmative action programmes. 
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Figure 3: trajectories of households per types of farming systems 
Source: Authors 
 
The trajectories of the emerging vegetable and broilers producers are good examples of how 
some small-scale farmers succeeded in concluding contracts in the study area (Figure 3). 
Seven individual farmers received productive farmland in 2002 through the Land Reform‟s 
Settlement Land and Acquisition Grant programme, complemented with loans from the Land 
Bank. After acquisition their farms collapsed due to, amongst others, inadequate experience 
and institutional support. In 2005, the Limpopo Department of Agriculture intervened with a 
multi-million Rand poultry project as part of the agri-BEE drive, including the construction of 
environmentally controlled houses with a carrying capacity each of 40 000 broilers per 32 day 
cycle (Anjuère and Boche, 2009; Business Report, 2010). One of the conditions for the 
farmers to benefit from the infrastructure was the conclusion of a five year resource-providing 
contract which the Department of Agriculture signed with the processor, Bushvalley. Broiler 
production effectively started in 2007. The contract terms include the following: Bush Valley 
is to provide farmers with all the required inputs (poultry equipment, one day old healthy 
broiler type chicks from a local hatchery, high quality balanced foodstuffs, poultry litter, 
disease prevention/control medicines etc.) and a strict monitoring plan for feeding and 
managing the chickens. All costs (input, transport and processing) are to be deducted from the 
amount producers are paid; the price is not pre-established and depends on the weight of the 
chickens. In addition to the provision of technical assistance, quality and hygiene inspections 
are to be conducted to ensure the highest quality of the products delivered (Anjuère and 
Boche, 2009; Limpopo Provincial Government, 2007). The project leaders also benefitted 
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from intensive training regarding poultry production in environmentally controlled facilities, 
provided through the DoA‟s comprehensive agricultural support programs. 
Determinants of agricultural income 
A Heckman model was used in order to test whether contracts could improve livelihoods. The 
first step of the model (Table 7) is a probit model of the determinants of the likelihood that the 
farmers commercialize their produce or not. Indeed, it is obvious that if a farmer is not able to 
generate marketable output, he won‟t be able to participate in any arrangement; testing if 
contract farming is a determinant of the farm income is in that case irrelevant. The first step of 
the model thus shows that an education above primary level is an important determinant of 
commercialization. Furthermore, households that receive larger social grants and who do not 
have access to irrigation infrastructure are less likely to commercialize any agricultural 
produce, which also corresponds with the results of the qualitative analysis. 
 
Table 7: Probit model of commercializing agricultural produce (0: no sales; 1: sales) 
STEP 1 of Heckman model  Coefficient Std. error z-stat 
Household size 0.052 0.063 0.83 
Age of household head (yrs) 0.062 0.144 0.43 
Age squared (yrs²) -0.0005 -0.001 -0.39 
Gender of household head (1:male/2:female) -0.638 0.556 -1.15 
Secondary education or more (1:yes) 1.615 0.537 3.00*** 
Log social grants (R) -0.293 0.168 -1.74* 
Log remittances (R) 0.044 0.050 0.87 
Rain-fed production (1:yes) -0.926 0.459 -2.01** 
Constant 1.524 4.138 0.37 
 
The second step of the model is a regression of the determinants of farm income (Table 8). 
The latter seems to be positively influenced by the number of active members on the farm, the 
level of specialization in agriculture, the size of the cultivated land and whether this land was 
acquired under private tenure or land reform. These determinants are all “classic” structural 
variables influencing farm income, as widely commented on in the literature. Further 
literature (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; FAO, 2005; IFAD, 2003; Little and Watts, 1994; World 
Bank, 2007) confirms that contracts positively influence farm income. 
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Table 8: Regression results for determinants of agricultural income (dependent 
variable: log of income from agriculture) 
STEP 2 of Heckman model Coefficient Robust std. error z-stat 
Household members active on farm 0.607 0.222 2.73*** 
Age of household head (yrs) -0.012 0.013 -0.94 
Gender of household head (1:male/2:female) 0.482 0.402 1.20 
Probability of contract  2.016 0.881 2.29** 
Log land size cultivated (log ha+1) 0.535 0.176 3.04*** 
Private land tenure (1:yes) 1.141 0.638 1.79* 
Land reform beneficiaries (1:yes) 1.796 0.615 2.92*** 
Rainfed production (1:yes) -0.203 0.500 -0.41 
Constant 7.623 1.000 7.62*** 
Inverse mills - Lambda  -0.597 0.560 -1.07 
n= 106 
Censored obs = 31 
Uncensored obs = 75  
Wald ch²=130.65 
Rho=-0.443 
Sigma= 1.348 
   
 
The analysis of the Heckman model confirms that farmers who generate higher farm incomes 
are also better endowed with respect to capital and production factors (land, private tenure, 
equipment etc.). The qualitative analysis (Figure 3 and Table 3) suggests that these farmers 
engage in contracts for different reasons: i) they are more concerned with ensuring stability in 
the flow of produce to specified markets rather than with accessing production factors, credit 
and other inputs as they already have access to these; this is specifically the case for 
commercial farmers who participate in either informal agreements or formal marketing 
contracts; ii) contract farming is „part of the deal‟ for gaining access to development 
programmes (agri-BEE, Public-Private Partnerships, land reform programmes, other public 
programmes for rural development, small-scale enterprises and agriculture, etc.), as illustrated 
by the emerging farmers. In this case, contract farming is a sine qua non condition for the 
farming system which is largely based on public support. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to contribute to the on-going debate about whether and how 
contract farming can provide viable market opportunities for small-scale farmers in South 
Africa.  
The results show, however, that contract farming is not a panacea for small-scale farmers. 
They highlight that contracts mostly involve the already well-off, who are either large-scale 
managerial commercial farmers having benefited from public support during apartheid and 
which enabled them to become highly productive, well-equipped and well-inserted in output 
markets, or medium-scale farmers who have benefited from case-specific public programmes 
and/or social or political connections. Both the qualitative and quantitative analyses confirm 
the existence of entry barriers for small-scale farmers in concluding contracts (production and 
commercialization scales, education and asset endowments such as access to land and 
irrigation). As such, although significant changes have occurred in South African agriculture, 
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small-scale farmers with limited access to assets and who rely mainly on diversified incomes 
(part time work, social grants etc.) to sustain their livelihoods, remain excluded and thus often 
marginalized. Hence, the results support the concerns around the inclusivity of contract 
farming posed elsewhere in the literature (Losch et al., 2010; Poulton et al., 2010; Vorley et 
al., 2007 amongst others).  
The results lead us to emphasize the need for disaggregated analyses of the farming systems, 
of their different structures, their diverse roles and, subsequently, of their different needs, 
policy measures and support systems. They also question the effectiveness of contract farming 
as a “mythic” tool to integrate small-scale farmers into restructured markets and modern 
value-chains and to reduce rural poverty and inequality. The heavy support and subsidized 
measures necessary to make contract farming work for the poor casts further doubt on the 
viability of these instruments. Rethinking instruments is a must in order to support the 
different types and roles of agriculture in the context of social dependency and exclusion of 
productive income-generating activities affecting the rural poor. This is particularly the case 
in South Africa, marked by its agrarian history. It applies however, also to other developing 
countries where the majority of farmers is engaged in agriculture solely for subsistence, 
within a complex and strongly diversified livelihood system. 
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Annex 1. Description of the Heckman model  
 
The empirical specification of market participation and income from agriculture problem 
takes the following form: 
 
iiii MXY    , (1‟) 
 
where Yi is agricultural income, Xi denotes the explanatory variables that influence 
agricultural income, and Mi is the dummy variable indicating the market participation 
decision (binary choice). In case of self-selection, the least square estimator  will be biased, 
i.e. overestimating the effect of market participation. The solution lies in incorporating a 
standard treatment effects model, which extends the program participation model (1‟) with 
(Greene, 2000, Maddala, 1983): 
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In reality, Mi
*
 is unobservable, whereas Mi is the dichotomous parameter of market 
participation (influenced by the set of explanatory variables Wi) as directly measured in the 
survey. Hence, the probability of market participation (2‟) can be defined as: 
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wherein  is a cumulative probability distribution for u (Maddala, 1983). The distributional 
form of  can either be a normal or logistic distribution. Since the issue of which probability 
distribution to use is unresolved (Greene, 2000), we assumed the distributional form of  as 
the cumulative normal (with  representing the standard normal pdf) and as such the problem 
can be solved as a probit model. 
 
Finally, the estimation of the linear regression model (1) will be: 
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is defined as the inverse Mills‟ ratio/lambda. As previously 
indicated, the estimation of this inverse Mills‟ ratio provides an answer to the issue of self-
selection bias or whether the estimator of market participation in the linear regression is 
biased. This is shown by the expected difference in agricultural income between market 
participants and non-participants derived from (4‟) as: 
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